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ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, ACCESS TO LAW, AND 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:  A 
COMMENT ON THE STANDARD CONCEPTION 
OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE 
Sung Hui Kim* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since Richard Wasserstrom’s seminal article almost fifty years ago,1 
academics have debated the propriety of the model that purports to guide the 
professional responsibility of lawyers—widely referred to as the “standard 
conception of the lawyer’s role.”2  This model combines the principles of 
“partisanship” and “neutrality.”3  Partisanship requires lawyers to promote 
the interests of their clients vigorously within the bounds of the law.4  
Neutrality requires lawyers to subordinate their moral concerns to those of 
the client and maintains that only the client is entitled to make moral choices.5  
In return, the lawyer is released from moral responsibility for any lawful ends 
achieved or lawful means used.6  As Wasserstrom explained, this model 
effectively licenses the lawyer to act as an “amoral technician” for the client: 
Once a lawyer represents a client, the lawyer has a duty to make his or her 
expertise fully available in the realization of the end sought by the client, 
irrespective . . . of the moral worth to which the end will be put or the 
character of the client who seeks to utilize it.  Provided that the end sought 
is not illegal, the lawyer is, in essence, an amoral technician whose peculiar 
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 1. See generally Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:  Some Moral Issues, 
5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975). 
 2. Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
63, 73 (1980) (referring to the “standard conception of the lawyer’s role”). 
 3. Id. at 73–74; William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:  Procedural Justice and 
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36–38; cf. Murray L. Schwartz, The 
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 674 (1978) (referring 
to “professionalism” and “nonaccountability” principles). 
 4. See Postema, supra note 2, at 73. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
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skills and knowledge in respect to the law are available to those with whom 
the relationship of client is established.7 
While Wasserstrom and others were troubled by the implications of the 
standard conception, some celebrated and defended the standard conception, 
insisting that a good lawyer, acting according to it, can be a good person.  
Some of these commentators advanced justifications of the standard 
conception, including its principle of neutrality, which were grounded in the 
value of autonomy.8  Although details among the various accounts differed, 
they largely embraced the view that the principle of neutrality was necessary 
to safeguard client autonomy.  They argued that the autonomy of individuals 
could only be fully realized if they were able to fully exercise their legal 
rights.  In our society, legal rights are realistically only accessible through a 
lawyer; accordingly, when lawyers foreclose or delimit access to legal 
services by—for example—refusing to assist in legally permissible but 
immoral projects, they are not only depriving clients of full and equal access 
to the law but also impairing clients’ autonomy. 
This Article contends that these autonomy-based defenses of the standard 
conception cannot withstand the “economic inequality” objection.  
According to this objection, the moral worthiness of lawyering under the 
standard conception cannot be reconciled with a legal system that is so 
marred by gross economic inequality such that only the wealthy have access 
to lawyers.  It can also not be reconciled with the fact that the wealthy 
routinely use lawyers to undermine the public interest and exploit others who 
cannot afford lawyers.  After examining responses to the economic inequality 
objection, this Article concludes that these responses do not take seriously 
how economic inequality can interact with the principle of neutrality to 
exacerbate inequality.  Specifically, they fail to consider the possibility that 
lawyers, acting according to the principle of neutrality, will foreclose others’ 
access to lawyers (and thereby the law) and undermine their autonomy—the 
very value that underwrites these defenses. 
The foreclosure of access to lawyers that this Article cites to is neither 
merely hypothetical nor an aberrational outcome of idiosyncratic lawyering.  
It is the systemic reality already faced by the approximately sixty million 
employees who are subject to employer-promulgated predispute mandatory 
arbitration agreements imposed as a condition of new or continuing 
employment in nonunion workplaces.  These agreements require employees 
to waive their right to file all statutory and common-law employment-related 
claims in court even before they have or know they have claims.  As will be 
detailed below, the most far-reaching consequence of these agreements is 
that they make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for employees to find 
 
 7. Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 8. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
(5th ed. 2016); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:  The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical 
Role:  A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613. 
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lawyers willing to represent them at all, even if they have legitimate, legally 
cognizable complaints. 
Part I examines some of the leading autonomy-based defenses of the 
standard conception and its principle of neutrality and their responses to the 
economic inequality objection.  It argues that these defenses rely on woefully 
incomplete characterizations of lawyer-client relationships and their impact.  
By emphasizing the discreteness of the lawyer-client relationship and the 
empowering potential of legal services, they ignore the fact that lawyers not 
only facilitate clients’ life goals but also facilitate the victimization of third 
persons, some of whom lack access to lawyers and therefore cannot redress 
that victimization.  As a result, these defenses underappreciate how the 
principle of neutrality will interact with economic inequality to reproduce 
and even aggravate the socioeconomic imbalances that plague the market for 
legal services. 
Part II provides one concrete example of how the principle of neutrality 
can interact with economic inequality to exacerbate inequality.  It shows how 
the neutrality principle has already operated in the employment context to 
deprive sixty million employees of their access to lawyers, making it 
impossible for these employees to vindicate their employment-related rights 
in any forum.  It argues that lawyers—who act according to the neutrality 
principle by facilitating the imposition of mandatory arbitration agreements 
on behalf of their employer-clients—are foreclosing employees’ access to 
lawyers and the law, which undermines their autonomy and impinges on the 
value that the defenders of the standard conception claim to embrace.9 
Part III further examines the impact of mandatory arbitration agreements 
on employees and argues that what is being countenanced is far worse than 
merely trading off one individual’s autonomy for another’s.  It argues that, 
when lawyers facilitate the promulgation of mandatory arbitration 
agreements for their employer-clients, they are promoting a weaker form of 
autonomy by depriving employees of a more fundamental form of autonomy.  
Specifically, lawyers are promoting employers’ freedom to make unimpeded 
choices at the expense of employees’ freedom from domination and 
subordination at the hands of their employers. 
I.  NEUTRALITY AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
The standard conception of the lawyer’s role has been defended by many 
prominent academics.  Perhaps the most notable autonomy-based 
justification was advanced in 1976 by Charles Fried, who grappled with the 
conception’s troubling implications, as previously raised by Wasserstrom.10  
Analogizing the lawyer-client relationship to that of friendship, Fried 
observed that the moral right to choose and prefer friends “is a product of our 
 
 9. While there are numerous contexts in which private arbitration is the forum of choice 
for resolving disputes (e.g., consumer contracts), due to the fundamental nature of the relevant 
legal rights involved and the magnitude of the stakes for individual claimants, this Article will 
only address mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context. 
 10. See generally Fried, supra note 8. 
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individual autonomy”11 and is integral to preserving the fundamental moral 
interests of “personality, identity, and liberty.”12  Fried then argued that the 
same value of autonomy supported the role of “legal friend” and morally 
justified the client’s access to lawyers and the client’s “right . . . to receive 
such an extra measure of care (without regard . . . to considerations of 
efficiency or fairness).”13  He noted: 
[A]t the very least the law must leave us a measure of autonomy, whether 
or not it is in the social interest to do so. . . .  It is because the law must 
respect the rights of individuals that the law must also create and support 
the specific role of legal friend.  For the social nexus—the web of perhaps 
entirely just institutions—has become so complex that without the 
assistance of an expert adviser an ordinary layman cannot exercise that 
autonomy which the system must allow him.14 
Accordingly, “[t]he lawyer acts morally because he helps to preserve and 
express the autonomy of his client vis-à-vis the legal system.”15  On Fried’s 
account, so long as the lawyer’s assistance remains lawful and does not 
involve so-called personal wrongs, such as lying, cheating, and 
humiliation,16 lawyers are morally justified in servicing their clients, 
regardless of whether third persons suffer an injustice or the representation 
is contrary to the public interest.17 
Almost a decade later, Stephen L. Pepper defended the lawyer’s “amoral 
ethical role”18 and, in particular, the principle of neutrality on similar 
grounds.  Pepper maintained that law was a public good because it facilitated 
the private attainment of individual or group goals, which increased 
individual autonomy, and that increasing autonomy was “morally good.”19  
Pepper further observed that “in a highly legalized society such as ours,” 
access to law “is available only through a lawyer.”20  Therefore, so long as 
lawyers were facilitating “conduct which . . . [was] not unlawful,” they were 
indeed promoting a “social good.”21  Conversely, if individual lawyers were 
permitted to constrain their legal services based on their moral consciences, 
then the legal profession would not only be infringing on the autonomy of 
clients but also facilitating unequal access to the law.22  Accordingly, Pepper 
 
 11. Id. at 1074. 
 12. Id. at 1068. 
 13. Id. at 1073–74. 
 14. Id. at 1073. 
 15. Id. at 1074. 
 16. Id. at 1080–86 (distinguishing between “personal” and “institutional” wrongs). 
 17. See id. at 1080 (noting that “the legal system . . . must at times allow that autonomy 
to be exercised in ways that do not further the public interest”). 
 18. See generally Pepper, supra note 8. 
 19. Id. at 616–17. 
 20. Id. at 617. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. at 617–18. 
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supported the adoption of a disciplinary rule that would limit lawyers’ 
discretion to opt out of clients’ immoral but legally permissible plans.23 
Likewise, Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith affirmed neutrality on 
autonomy grounds.24  They argued that “[t]he lawyer, by virtue of her 
training and skills, has a monopoly over access to the legal system and 
knowledge about the law.  Consequently, the lawyer’s advice and assistance 
are often indispensable to the effective exercise of individual autonomy.”25  
Therefore, once a lawyer-client relationship has been formed, “the lawyer’s 
devotion and zeal cannot be tempered by moral judgments of the client or of 
the client’s cause.”26  If lawyers “preempt [clients’] moral decisions, or . . . 
depriv[e] them of the ability to carry out their lawful decisions,” lawyers are 
acting “unprofessionally and immorally” and “depriv[ing] clients of [their] 
autonomy.”27  However, Freedman and Smith make an exception to the 
neutrality principle in one situation:  the “lawyer can be ‘called to account’ 
and is not ‘beyond reproof’ for the decision to accept a particular client or 
cause.”28  That decision is a “moral decision for which the lawyer can 
properly be held morally accountable.”29 
To be clear, the foregoing accounts do support lawyers’ expressing their 
own morality.  They permit, and even encourage, moral dialogue between 
lawyers and clients.30  However, they all agree that, where the lawyer and the 
client have reached an impasse on moral issues, the lawyer must and should 
accede to the client’s lawful wishes. 
There are many grounds on which to criticize these autonomy-based 
defenses of the standard conception and its principle of neutrality.  As others 
have argued, these accounts improperly conflate the moral desirability of 
acting autonomously—i.e., without interference or coercion—with the moral 
desirability of the autonomous act itself.31  For example, it may be “good” in 
one sense that a sixteen-year-old girl was not coerced by others into marrying 
a forty-year-old man (which is still legal in some states).  But that is a separate 
question from whether her decision to enter into the marriage is good—from 
 
 23. See Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 1986 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 657, 659 [hereinafter Pepper, Rejoinder] (“A background assumption 
accompanying the first-class citizenship model is that it can support an enforceable 
professional ethic, that it can be embodied in legal rules.”).  It is unclear whether Pepper still 
holds this view. See Stephen L. Pepper, Integrating Morality and Law in Legal Practice:  A 
Reply to Professor Simon, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1018 (2010) [hereinafter Pepper, 
Integrating Morality] (noting that if the lawyer is unwilling to facilitate a morally wrongful 
result, “she can refuse to assist”). 
 24. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 8, at 62. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 52. 
 27. Id. at 62. 
 28. Id. at 75. 
 29. Id. at 70. 
 30. See id. at 75; Fried, supra note 8, at 1088; Pepper, Integrating Morality, supra note 
23, at 1016–18. 
 31. See David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative:  A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 639. 
1670 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
a moral, social, or psychological perspective—or, alternatively, whether it is 
good as a public policy matter to allow child marriage. 
The narrow purpose of this Article, however, is to revisit one objection 
that has been made against the standard conception—the “economic 
inequality” objection.  According to this objection, the moral 
praiseworthiness of the standard conception cannot be reconciled with a legal 
system where wealth determines access to counsel and where the interests of 
those affected by the outcome of negotiations or litigation often go 
unrepresented.32  Because the market for legal services is so tainted by 
inaccessibility and inequality, one cannot assume (as defenses of the standard 
conception tend to) that justice is done and that the public interest is served 
when lawyers adhere to the principles of partisanship and neutrality.  
Furthermore, injustice is often compounded because rich clients routinely use 
legal services to “avoid their obligations in justice” and to “perpetuate their 
(legal) domination of the very groups whose greater needs these lawyers 
should be meeting.”33  In short, the maldistribution of legal services resulting 
from gross economic inequality vitiates the moral justifications of the 
standard conception. 
Defenders of the standard conception, who have responded to the 
economic inequality objection, have generally insisted that the problem of 
economic inequality cannot speak to the morality of the lawyer’s work for 
her client and, accordingly, those two issues should be segregated.  For 
example, Fried readily acknowledged the problem of the “maldistribution of 
a scarce resource, the aid of counsel.”34  Nevertheless, Fried concluded, 
“legal counsel—like medical care—must be considered a good, and . . . he 
who provides it does a useful thing.”35  Further, Fried insisted, 
maldistribution “in no way questions that conclusion.”36  After all, “[t]he 
lawyer-client relation is a personal relation” and “the creature of moral right”; 
the relation is born of clients’ needs and exists to secure a “measure of 
autonomy” for the client.37  Continuing with the analogy of medical care, 
Fried contended: 
If I have a client with legal needs, then neither another person with greater 
needs nor a court should be able to compel or morally oblige me to 
compromise my care for those needs.  To hold differently would apply the 
concept of battlefield emergency care (triage) to the area of regular legal 
service.  But doctors do not operate that way and neither should lawyers.38 
 
 32. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:  LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN 
AMERICA 281 (1976). 
 33. Fried, supra note 8, at 1062 (characterizing the objection). 
 34. Id. at 1076–77. 
 35. Id. at 1077. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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Therefore, on Fried’s account, “considerations of efficiency or fair 
distribution cannot be allowed to weaken” the lawyer-client relation, and “it 
is the client’s needs which hold the reins—legally and morally.”39 
Similarly, Pepper insisted that the problem of unequal access to legal 
services remained a separate issue from the morality of the lawyer’s 
representation of the client.  He noted, “[l]ike almost everything else in our 
society, access to law is rationed through the market—in this case, the market 
for lawyers’ services.”40  He continued: 
[T]here are two issues here:  the distribution of legal services and the 
content of what is distributed.  The moral content of what is distributed—
the ethical nature of the lawyer-client relationship once established—is the 
subject of this essay.  The distribution of access to the law (legal services) 
is a different subject.41 
In conclusion, Pepper denied that the problem of unequal access to the law 
could ever generate reasons to support morally constrained lawyering:  “To 
suggest that transforming the amoral facilitator role of the lawyer into the 
judge/facilitator role follows from the insufficient availability of legal 
services is a non sequitur.”42 
The problem with these responses is that one can no more cabin off 
unequal access to the law in determining whether and how to constrain the 
provision of legal services than one can cabin off unequal bargaining power 
in determining whether to enforce contracts of adhesion.  Another analogy 
can be drawn from the absurd notion that one can ignore how economic 
power is distributed when attempting to reform our current dysfunctional 
political and constitutional system, including our system of campaign 
finance.43  The legal system and the legal services market are no less skewed 
by the intractable problem of economic inequality than our socioeconomic 
and political systems are.  To defend a moral (or amoral) framework of legal 
ethics without accounting for the radically unequal economic and social 
power that comprise the background conditions under which legal services 
are delivered is to retreat into the empty formalism that legal realists have 
long criticized.  To put it bluntly, the legal system does not exist in a vacuum. 
Also, these responses to the economic inequality objection rely on a 
skewed characterization of lawyer-client relationships.  They emphasize the 
client’s vulnerability and overdependence on the lawyer and exclude 
scenarios in which clients dominate lawyers or lawyers are financially 
dependent on clients.  For example, by invoking the doctor,44 Fried skillfully 
insinuated the image of an individual in adversity who needs a professional’s 
care and attention.  This image suppresses our instinct to constrain or ration 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Pepper, supra note 8, at 619. 
 41. Id. at 619–20. 
 42. Id. at 620. 
 43. See generally Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth:  Inequality and the Erosion of 
Checks and Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419 (2015). 
 44. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
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the scarce resource.  But this image is misleading.  As Rick Abel has 
remarked about a similar image, it 
obscures the fact that lawyers devote most of their efforts to counseling 
business enterprises about familiar, repetitive situations, seeking to 
facilitate future transactions in which gain, not need, is the motive and in 
which only the economic interests of large corporate entities are at stake, 
not individual property, much less freedom or life.45 
Fried’s analogy also ignores a key distinction between the nature of 
medical and legal services.  A doctor’s care for her patient—typically, by 
examining the patient and then prescribing treatment—will rarely generate 
direct, concrete harms to third persons.  In the unusual case where treatment 
of a patient leads directly to the harm of others—for example, repairing the 
hand of someone who then uses it to abuse her spouse—the doctor will rarely 
anticipate or even know about the harm.  By contrast, lawyers routinely 
perform or facilitate acts in which lawyers knowingly, and sometimes 
intentionally, inflict harms (justified or not) on third persons.  The point is 
that, unlike doctors, lawyers often find themselves in positions where they 
can actually take action that might avert or minimize harm to third persons. 
Similarly, Pepper’s framing of the lawyer-client relationship obscures the 
fact that lawyers knowingly inflict harms on third persons.  This obfuscation 
is achieved through repeated, overly benign characterizations of law as an 
instrument by which an individual (or group) can attain her (or their) life 
goals.  For example, in defending the “premise . . . that law is a public good,” 
Pepper observed: 
“[L]awmakers” . . . ha[ve] created various mechanisms to ease and enable 
the private attainment of individual or group goals.  The corporate form of 
enterprise, the contract, the trust, the will, and access to civil court to gain 
the use of public force for the settlement of private grievance are all 
vehicles of empowerment for the individual or group . . . .  In addition to 
these structuring mechanisms are vast amounts of law, knowledge of which 
is intended to be generally available and is empowering:  landlord/tenant 
law, labor law, OSHA, Social Security . . . .  Access to both forms of law 
increases one’s ability to successfully attain goals.46 
By highlighting the lawyer’s role in helping clients reach their goals, 
Pepper emphasized the discreteness of the lawyer-client relationship, as well 
as the empowering potential of legal services.  It is thus not surprising that, 
when Pepper addressed the economic inequality objection, he assumed that 
the plight of the have-nots who are unable to pursue their own goals cannot 
be helped by insisting that lawyers for the haves change the way they serve 
their clients.47  On Pepper’s account, it would seem to be an exercise of 
 
 45. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 
677–78 (1981). 
 46. Pepper, supra note 8, at 616. 
 47. For purposes of this Article, the haves are elite individuals and large organizations 
who tend to have greater power, wealth, status, and access to lawyers than the have-nots. See 
generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).  Pepper might reply that his defense of 
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futility to ask lawyers for the haves to forbear and to level the playing field 
for the sake of the have-nots.  It would be akin to telling higher-achieving 
students to study less so that lower-achieving students can catch up. 
But if we zoom out from this image of the discrete and detached lawyer-
client relationship, we can more easily visualize an alternative framing of the 
lawyer-client relationship—one that is much less atomistic and that exposes 
the destructive potential of legal services.  That framing more fully 
acknowledges that the lives of the haves and the have-nots intersect in 
complex, often troubling ways.48  In fact, the plight of the have-nots can 
actually depend on how lawyers for the haves provide their legal assistance.  
Indeed, some of the have-nots seeking lawyers need them not because they 
have grand plans to execute or big life goals to reach but because they have 
been wronged or victimized by one of the haves (whose lawyers facilitated 
the victimization).49  Therefore, the have-nots require legal help either to 
remediate the wrong or to stop further victimization.  In other words, 
sometimes the have-nots are the hapless third parties who have been harmed 
by the lawyer-have relationship. 
Moreover, situations where haves and have-nots directly interact in 
problematic ways are not exactly rare.  Just think about the ubiquity of 
landlord-tenant, employer-employee, health insurer–insured, retailer-
consumer, and manufacturer-consumer relationships.  And intersections are 
not confined to relationships of contractual privity.  Think about how the 
have-nots are disproportionately impacted by environmental pollutants 
generated from well-counseled, large-scale businesses or how the have-nots 
are affected when the public fisc is chronically depressed because lawyers 
have helped billionaires successfully dodge taxes. 
Given how commonplace such intersections are, it is reasonable (and thus 
not a non sequitur)50 to implore lawyers for the haves to exercise restraint 
and avoid placing the have-nots in situations where they need lawyers but 
cannot access them.  By refusing to forbear and, instead, assisting immoral 
(but legally permissible) plans, lawyers for the haves can aggravate the 
economic, social, and psychological standing of the have-nots.  In doing so, 
lawyers are exacerbating the consequences of economic inequality and 
assaulting the very value of autonomy that underwrites defenses of the 
standard conception. 
In sum, the foregoing autonomy-based defenses of the standard conception 
and its principle of neutrality cannot withstand the economic inequality 
 
neutrality was not intended for the corporate client.  But that claim would be tough to square 
with his explicit references to corporations and groups. See Pepper, supra note 8, at 616 
(referring to the “private attainment of . . . group goals” and “corporate form of enterprise”); 
id. at 622–23 (citing the example of Sears’s in-house lawyer drafting form consumer contracts 
covering consumer-plaintiffs). 
 48. Cf. Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers:  A Relational Approach to 
Law Practice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 601, 612–37 (2016) (rejecting the extreme 
individualist/atomistic approach to legal ethics in favor of a relational approach). 
 49. See, e.g., infra Part II. 
 50. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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objection.  These defenses rely on woefully incomplete characterizations of 
lawyer-client relationships and their impact.  By emphasizing the 
discreteness of the lawyer-client relationship and the empowering potential 
of legal services, they ignore the reality that lawyers not only facilitate 
clients’ life goals but also facilitate the victimization of third persons, some 
of whom lack access to lawyers and therefore cannot redress that 
victimization.  As a result, these defenses underappreciate how the principle 
of neutrality will interact with the problem of economic inequality to 
reproduce and even aggravate the socioeconomic imbalances that plague the 
market for legal services. 
II.  MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
But it is not just that the leading defenses of the standard conception 
underappreciate how the neutrality principle will interact with economic 
inequality to exacerbate inequality.  They also fail to consider the possibility 
that this interaction can lead to the systematic deprivation of individuals’ 
access to lawyers.  This Part provides one concrete example, among many,51 
of such an interaction.  Approximately sixty million employees, representing 
an estimated 56 percent of the nonunion private sector workforce,52 are 
covered by employer-promulgated predispute mandatory arbitration 
agreements (MAAs), which have been imposed as a condition of new or 
continuing employment.53  MAAs require employees to waive their right to 
file all statutory and common-law employment-related claims in court even 
before they have or know they have claims.54  As will be argued below, 
lawyers, who adhere to the principle of neutrality55 and facilitate the 
implementation of MAAs for their employer-clients, are foreclosing 
employees’ access to lawyers and the law and undermining their autonomy. 
Although the Federal Arbitration Act56 (FAA) was passed in 1925 to 
provide an alternative forum for the fair and efficient resolution of 
 
 51. See infra note 115. 
 52. ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION 5 (2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHQ2-
Y8UU].  This estimate excludes those categories of agreements listed in infra note 53, as well 
as unionized workplaces, which constitute less than 7 percent of the private sector. Jean R. 
Sternlight, Disarming Employees:  How American Employers Are Using Mandatory 
Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1313 (2015). 
 53. As with most of the literature on the subject, this Article excludes from the definition 
of MAAs (i) individually negotiated arbitration agreements, typically entered into by high-
salaried professional or managerial employees; (ii) collective bargaining agreements; and (iii) 
postdispute agreements to arbitrate.  These excluded agreements are “more likely to be a 
mutually beneficial alternative to either litigation or labor-management strife.” Cynthia 
Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 683 (2018). 
 54. See Sternlight, supra note 52, at 1310 n.7. 
 55. This Article adopts the assumption that corporate lawyers adhere to the principle of 
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commercial disputes,57 it has been reinterpreted over the last few decades in 
unprecedented ways to divest employees of their legal rights.  The most 
relevant history begins in 1991, when the U.S. Supreme Court opened the 
door to mandatory arbitration of nonunion employment claims in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.58  In Gilmer, the Court held that a broker 
could be compelled to arbitrate his age discrimination claim against his 
brokerage firm pursuant to an arbitration clause embedded in a standard stock 
exchange registration form.59  The broker was required to sign this form as a 
condition of registering as a member of the stock exchange.60  While Gilmer 
did not involve an employment contract per se,61 the decision’s applicability 
to a statutory claim that typically arises in the employment context 
emboldened employers to adopt MAAs for their own workforce.62 
Any lingering doubts about whether courts would apply the FAA to 
employment settings were dispelled in 2001.  In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams,63 the Court clarified that employers could require their employees to 
arbitrate their claims against employers, despite language in the FAA that 
had long been thought to foreclose the arbitration of employment-related 
claims.64  After Circuit City, however, it remained unclear whether 
employers could use MAAs to compel a waiver of the right to participate in 
class or group actions.  This right had long been seen as critical because 
minimum wage, overtime, or unfair wage claims brought by low-wage 
employees or involving incremental pay disparities under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 193865 (FLSA) or the Equal Pay Act of 196366 rely on the 
ability to aggregate multiple small recovery claims as the only feasible means 
of justifying the costs of litigation and thus of securing legal representation.67 
In 2011 and 2013, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion68 and American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,69 the Court enforced group action 
 
 57. KATHERINE V. W. STONE & ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE 
ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC 7 (2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf 
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 58. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 59. Id. at 23–35. 
 60. Id. at 23. 
 61. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 57, at 10 (noting that the arbitration clause was 
embedded “in a contract between an employee and the agency with which the employee was 
required to register to get the job”). 
 62. Sternlight, supra note 52, at 1317. 
 63. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 64. Id. at 109 (interpreting the FAA exemption for “contracts of employment of seamen, 
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 67. See Estlund, supra note 53, at 695; Sternlight, supra note 52, at 1347. 
 68. 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (enforcing a class action waiver in a boilerplate consumer 
contract). 
 69. 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (enforcing a group action waiver in a merchant credit card 
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waivers in nonemployee contexts against challenges under a state’s 
unconscionability doctrine and federal antitrust law.70  Finally, in 2018, in 
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,71 the Court enforced group action waivers 
against employees, rejecting the argument that such waivers violated 
employees’ right to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of . . . 
mutual aid or protection,” as provided for by the National Labor Relations 
Act.72  With Epic Systems, the Court basically eliminated the only means for 
certain types of employment claims to be vindicated in any forum.  Epic 
Systems is expected to accelerate the already growing trend of employers 
incorporating group action waivers in their MAAs.  As of 2017, an estimated 
24.7 million private-sector, nonunion employees are subject to group action 
waivers contained in arbitration clauses.73 
Many aspects of the private arbitration of employment disputes are 
troubling.  Enforceable arbitration clauses are often embedded in contracts 
of adhesion, written in fine print, neither negotiated nor signed, and neither 
known nor understood by employees.74  There is no external regulation of 
private arbitration to ensure that arbitrators are qualified and impartial, 
despite the concern voiced by academics and journalists that employers 
overwhelmingly benefit from a structural, “repeat player” advantage over 
employees.75  As commentators have long observed, private arbitration is 
afflicted with a pro-employer bias, delivering second-class justice to 
employees subject to them.76  Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain what type 
of second-class justice private arbitration delivers, as there is almost no 
transparency in arbitral forums.77  Most importantly, for purposes of this 
Article, MAAs threaten to deprive employees of access to law by eroding 
their ability to obtain legal representation. 
A recent empirical analysis of available data, performed by Cynthia 
Estlund, suggests that MAAs are systematically suppressing the filing of 
meritorious employment claims, even in arbitration,78 a conclusion also 
reached by other employment law experts.79  As a starting point for Estlund’s 
analysis, in 2016, an estimated 5126 employment cases were filed in 
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arbitration by the approximately sixty million employees covered by 
MAAs.80  By comparison, in the same year, an estimated 26,300 employment 
cases were filed in federal courts.81  For state courts of general jurisdiction, 
the volume of filings is notoriously difficult to verify; however, one analysis, 
based on two large studies of state court litigation, concluded that 
approximately 195,000 employment suits are filed each year in state courts.82  
If we reflect the fact that a significant subset of the federal filings represent 
federal class or collective actions under the FLSA, then the estimated number 
of federal and state court filings in 2016 would balloon to a conservative 
estimate of approximately 571,300 cases.83 
Extrapolating from that figure, Estlund estimates that one would have 
expected anywhere between 320,000 and 727,000 arbitration cases filed for 
the year,84 instead of the estimated 5126 that appear to have been filed.85  
What this means is that between 315,000 and 722,000 arbitrations in 2016 
were likely “missing”—that is, between 315,000 and 722,000 employment 
claims were suppressed by virtue of being subject to MAAs.86  In other 
words, it is possible that less than 2 percent of the employment claims that 
one would expect to be filed in any forum, but that are covered by MAAs, 
end up being filed in arbitration.87  As a result, the “overwhelming majority 
of claims that would have been litigated but for the presence of an MAA are 
simply dropped without being filed in any forum at all.”88  As Estlund 
concludes, “[m]andatory arbitration is less of an ‘alternative dispute 
resolution’ mechanism than it is a . . . black hole into which matter collapses 
and no light escapes.”89 
The most likely explanation for the significantly lower filing rates in 
arbitration is that lawyers are dramatically less willing to represent employee 
claims that are destined for arbitration rather than for litigation.  To be sure, 
it is important not to overstate the ability of employees, who are not subject 
to MAAs, to find lawyers.  Indeed, only about 10 percent of employees 
seeking lawyers for litigation actually succeed in finding representation.90  
Because employees ordinarily cannot afford to pay legal fees at hourly rates 
out of pocket, especially if they have just lost their jobs, they must obtain 
legal representation on a contingent fee basis, whereby the lawyer only 
recovers if the plaintiff prevails.  In fact, most plaintiff-side employment 
lawyers represent the bulk of their clients on a partially or entirely contingent 
fee basis.91  Contingent fee arrangements are known to discourage lawyers 
 
 80. Estlund, supra note 53, at 690–93. 
 81. Id. at 691–93. 
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 84. Id. at 696. 
 85. Id. at 692. 
 86. Id. at 697 fig.2. 
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 90. Id. at 702 (citing a study). 
 91. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 57, at 21 (citing a study). 
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from taking on employment claims with low expected recoveries, even if 
they are meritorious.92  Such claims may be riskier to win on the merits (e.g., 
they lack “smoking gun” evidence); they may require substantial upfront 
cash expenditures (e.g., due to the case being factually complex or requiring 
statistical proof or expert testimony); or the financial recoveries at stake may 
be relatively small (e.g., the plaintiff is a low-wage employee).93  The same 
general dynamic is magnified for private arbitration because MAAs can 
further lower the expected recoveries of employment claims, impairing the 
economic feasibility for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring such claims. 
One way in which MAAs further lower expected recoveries is by 
incorporating provisions that impede the full and fair adjudication of 
otherwise valid claims.  Those provisions may 
bar the claim altogether (like a very short limitations period or unaffordable 
arbitrator fees), or impede investigation (like very limited discovery), or 
sharply skew proceedings against the complainant (like a biased arbitrator 
pool or a skewed selection process), or curtail recovery even in the event 
of “success” (like provisions against attorney fee shifting or punitive 
damages, or damage limits).94 
Group action waivers, as noted above, make certain employment claims 
economically infeasible for plaintiffs’ lawyers to take on.95  Even if a 
provision is vague or potentially invalid, it can still deter lawyers from 
representing the claim in the first place.  After all, any challenges to an 
arbitration agreement will likely be decided by the arbitral forum itself, and 
arbitrators are likely to strike and sever the invalid portion, rather than 
invalidate the entire MAA.96 
Even without the baggage of particularly prohibitive or especially unfair 
provisions, the expected recoveries on claims in arbitration will generally be 
lower than those in litigation and often below the threshold of economic 
viability for plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Expected recoveries are, of course, based on 
lawyers’ estimates of actual recoveries.  The limited data available suggest 
that not only are actual recoveries significantly lower in arbitration (than in 
litigation)97 but also that employees are less likely to prevail in arbitration 
and recover anything.98  Much less is known about pro se employee-
claimants, but existing studies on pro se claimants in other contexts suggest 
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2020] THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN MANDATORY ARBITRATION 1679 
that they fare even worse.99  As Estlund concludes, “it looks as though the 
presence of a mandatory arbitration provision dramatically reduces an 
employee’s chance of securing legal representation, as well as her chance of 
any kind of recovery, any kind of hearing, or any formal complaint being 
filed on her behalf.”100 
If MAAs have the claim-suppressive effect that a growing chorus of 
experts believe they do,101 then the lawyers who adhere to the principle of 
neutrality and facilitate MAAs for their employer-clients are complicit, 
wittingly or not, in the foreclosure of employees’ access to lawyers.  
Accordingly, those lawyers are facilitating the systematic divestment of 
employees’ legal rights—statutory and common-law rights that are supposed 
to be nonwaivable as a matter of positive law.102  And those divested rights, 
such as the right to be free of discrimination and sexual harassment, the right 
to be free of lie-detector tests and retaliation for whistleblowing, and the right 
to be paid a fair wage and provided a safe and healthful workplace,103 are not 
trivial.  They are rights “constitutive of civil society,” and they are intended 
to safeguard the autonomy and equal dignity of citizens with respect to the 
nonelective activity of earning a living.104 
Moreover, this systematic divestment of critical legal rights cannot be 
easily remedied.  Even assuming that an employee is lucky enough to secure 
pro bono representation before the employment relationship is formed (and 
before the MAA is imposed), it is highly unlikely that bargaining power 
dynamics would be altered such that an employer would agree to relinquish 
its MAA.  And reliance on pro bono representation to pursue a claim in 
arbitration will rarely be worth the effort, considering that most lawyers lack 
the training to competently handle employment disputes.105  Also, walking 
away from the employment relationship will not be a realistic option for 
many employees, as MAAs are becoming the norm for some industries, such 
as the national restaurant chain and retail industries.106  And Congress is 
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unlikely to move anytime soon to overrule Supreme Court precedent or 
meaningfully regulate private arbitration.  Finally, lobbying for 
comprehensive law reform, though welcomed, is likely futile, as employers 
have far superior economic resources than advocates for employee rights. 
This example demonstrates how the interaction between the principle of 
neutrality and the problem of economic inequality can lead to the wholesale 
divestment of fundamental legal rights of the have-nots.  What is more, this 
outcome was accomplished by depriving individuals of their access to 
lawyers, which—according to some defenses of the standard conception—is 
critical for supporting the autonomy of persons.107  Therefore, those lawyers, 
who are promoting their clients’ goals consistently with the principle of 
neutrality, are not only depriving individuals of access to the law but are also 
undermining their autonomy—the very value that defenders of the standard 
conception claim to embrace.  Unless these defenders can offer persuasive 
reasons why supporting the autonomy of one’s own clients morally justifies 
depriving others of their autonomy,108 the autonomy-based justifications 
must fail on their own terms. 
III.  AUTONOMY REDUX 
Unfortunately, what is being countenanced is actually far worse than 
merely trading off one person’s autonomy for another’s.  Lawyers’ 
promotion of clients’ autonomy at the expense of others’ cannot be regarded 
as an equivalent exchange.  There are, after all, multiple conceptions of 
autonomy, with some considerably weightier than others.  What in fact is 
being condoned when lawyers facilitate the promulgation of MAAs is the 
promotion of a weaker form of autonomy at the expense of a more 
fundamental form of autonomy. 
When defenders of the standard conception assert that lawyers enhance the 
autonomy of clients by facilitating clients’ lawful objectives, they are 
referring to the freedom to do what one wants—choosing freely without 
external constraints.109  This particular understanding of autonomy is nothing 
less than the dominant, negative conception of liberty110 at the heart of the 
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classical liberal tradition—the notion that people are free simply to the extent 
that their choices are not interfered with:  “to be free, more or less, is to be 
left alone to do whatever one pleases:  to not be blocked by the obstructions 
of others and, in most versions, to not be burdened by their coercive 
threats.”111  Because Fried, Pepper, Freedman, and Smith apparently 
consider the freedom to act without interference as a preeminent moral value, 
they regard any constraints imposed by lawyers on clients’ ends, beyond the 
minimum demanded by positive law, to be an undue infringement on clients’ 
autonomy.112  Accordingly, lawyers must promote their clients’ freedom—
understood as noninterference—by maximizing clients’ lawful goals. 
There is, however, an alternative conception of autonomy that is 
implicated when employees are divested of their critical legal rights.  An 
individual enjoys this more fundamental form of autonomy only insofar as 
she is not dominated or subordinated by others.  And she is not dominated 
by others only insofar as she is protected by laws, institutions, and social 
norms against the arbitrary exercise of power over her with respect to a 
socially defined set of fundamental life choices.113  This alternative 
understanding of autonomy is nothing less than the classical republican 
notion of freedom—understood as nondomination.114 
When lawyers help employers deprive employees of critical legal rights 
by promulgating MAAs, they are not merely constraining employees’ free 
exercise of choice.  Rather, they are dismantling the legal and institutional 
protections intended to secure employees’ freedom from domination by their 
employers.  Devoid of protections that safeguard their free and equal status 
as citizens vis-à-vis the fundamental activity of earning a living, employees 
become exposed to the arbitrary exercise of their employers’ power.  And, 
undeterred and unconstrained by laws that protect the basic liberties to be 
free from discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in the workplace, 
employers are more or less free to exercise arbitrary power over their 
employees—i.e., they are free to do as they please with their employees.  By 
promoting their employer-clients’ free exercise of choice, lawyers are 
undermining employees’ freedom from domination at the hands of their 
employers.115  Those employees are rendered second-class citizens. 
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CONCLUSION 
Far from mitigating the problem of economic inequality that afflicts our 
socioeconomic, political, and legal systems, the standard conception of the 
lawyer’s role can and does exacerbate it.  Not merely entrenching power, 
lawyers—by simply doing what they routinely do when they privately order 
their clients’ affairs—can amplify power, potentially undermining the 
autonomy and equal dignity of individuals.  Unfortunately, the example 
discussed herein is not an isolated one, as there are numerous contexts in 
which lawyers have deprived individuals of their critical legal rights.116  
Indeed, the systemic nature of this problem suggests that systemic 
solutions—not piecemeal legislative band-aids—are needed.  To that end, 
this Article calls for an alternative model of legal ethics based not on thin 
versions of autonomy heretofore embraced but on a more demanding 
conceptualization of autonomy based on the value of freedom as 
nondomination. 
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